He 111H-16 `1G+LY' of 14.(Eis.)/KG 27 `Boelcke', Kemenetz, November
1944 While I./KG 27's strategic bombing campaign against the Soviet railway
system was short-lived, the anti-railway specialists of 14.(Eis.)/KG 27 spent
their entire two-year operational career (from February 1943 to early 1945)
flying train-busting missions deep behind enemy lines. Operating alone at
night, this Staffel's aircraft wore a variety of appropriate nocturnal
finishes, such as that shown here, and eschewed yellow theatre markings
altogether. Each was heavily armed (including ventral gun packs), but the jury
is still out as to whether the device shown here on the tail of `LY' is a
grenade-launcher or (as one source suggests) a glider tug attachment.
KGr. 100 spent the latter half of August 1941 attacking a
broader range of targets. Its missions included a night raid on Gomel, a dusk
attack on the Dorogobush heavy flak batteries, a night harassment raid on
Moscow and the bombing of a Soviet airfield near Vyazma. In addition, crews
also went after traffic on the enemy's rear-area roads and railways, seriously
disrupting the delivery of supplies to the front. On 23 August one crew put a
large Russian railway gun out of action by plastering it with their full load
of 32 SD 50 semi-armour piercing bombs.
September 1941, while the ground forces of Army Group Centre
prepared to resume the offensive that it was hoped would take them all the way
to Moscow, the He 111s of Luftflotte 2 continued their attacks on the enemy's
railway network. Returning from one such mission in the Orel region on 28
September, a machine of 1./KGr. 100 was badly damaged by a `taran' attack and
forced to make an emergency landing with two of its crew severely wounded.
The Heinkels of KG 53 were heavily involved in Taifun from
the outset, at first flying in direct support of the ground forces by attacking
Red Army troop and tank concentrations immediately in their path, and then
ranging further afield to bomb railway supply lines in the Kaluga and Tula
areas to the south of Moscow. But they too were caught completely unawares by
the unusually early onset of the harsh Russian winter of 1941/42. On 11 October
the temperature suddenly plummeted to minus 22 degrees Celsius overnight;
`Shatalovka, which had been a sea of muddy puddles
yesterday, was today a sheet of ice. The aircraft engines didn't have
sufficient anti-freeze. Radiators and coolant pumps froze solid. The crews
froze too - their feet, noses, ears and fingers. It was risky to fly for any
length of time at high altitudes, as the machines' heating systems could not
compete with the intense cold. Oxygen masks froze. Altitude sickness and
frostbite were the results.'
For the first week of Taifun KGr. 100 attacked a wide range
of targets, including traffic on the main Smolensk-Moscow highway, Orel
airfield and the enemy rail network as far south as Kursk.
The departure of KGr. 100 left KG 53 as the sole He 111
bomber presence in the central sector. From Shatalovka its crews were doing all
they could to support the ground forces' drive on Moscow, but they were not
finding it easy. The worsening weather - heavy snow showers and low clouds -
was forcing them to operate at ever-lower altitudes as they attacked enemy
troop positions and the railway supply lines. This inevitably led to an
increase in casualties. On 23 October the Geschwader lost five machines, four
of them from III./KG 53 alone, including the Kapitäne of both 7. and 9.
Staffeln.
After their brief sojourn at Bojary under the temporary
command of Luftflotte 2, the Heinkels of I. and II./KG 55 had returned to the
southern sector in July and August, respectively. Based initially at Zhitomir,
the two Gruppen had first operated in support of Panzergruppe 1's advance on
Kiev. They had then transferred down to Kirovograd at the end of
August/beginning of September. From here they continued to participate in the
developing `cauldron' battle of Kiev by patrolling the roads and railways to
the east of the Ukrainian capital and bringing much of the enemy's supply
traffic to a virtual standstill. One 3. Staffel crew alone claimed the
destruction of seven railway trains in the course of a single mission.
The two Gruppen continued their campaign against the Soviet
rail network, as there was more than 2500 kilometres of track within their
radius of operations. Such was the efficiency of the Red Army's engineers that
no sooner had one stretch of line been destroyed than it was repaired and
traffic was soon flowing again. II. and III./KG 55 were therefore ordered to
direct their attacks against the rolling stock itself. This paid better
dividends. It is estimated that the two Gruppen accounted for no fewer than 222
trains, including 21 ammunition trains and 13 fuel trains, and that 64
locomotives were totally destroyed. The discrepancy between the number of
trains and locomotives claimed is partly explained by the fact that, at the
first signs of aerial attack, the Soviets would often uncouple the valuable
locomotive, which would then make off at full steam, leaving the train to its
fate!
In the northern sector there had been no He 111 bomber units
at all for the opening six weeks of Barbarossa. The first to arrive in the area
were the three Gruppen of KG 4, which had touched down at Koroye Selo, south of
Lake Peipus, on 6 August. They flew their first mission in the north two days
later - a daylight attack on Soviet troops in the Slepino region - before
embarking upon a succession of nightly missions against the Russian rail
network stretching from the Estonian border eastwards to Leningrad.
Staffel, 14.(Eis.)/KG
27
Operation Zitadelle was designed to `pinch off ' this bulge
by launching simultaneous attacks on its northern and southern edges and then
destroy the Soviet forces trapped inside it. The Luftwaffe gathered close on
2000 combat aircraft in preparation for the forthcoming operation. This
represented nearly three-quarters of its entire available strength on the
Russian front and included all ten Heinkel Kampfgruppen currently operational
in the east. Under the newly established Luftflotte 6 to the north of the bulge
were II. and III./KG 4 which, together with I. and III./KG 53, were based on
fields around Karachev and Bryansk (I./KG 4 and II./KG 53 were both in Germany
refitting and re-equipping). South of the bulge, as part of Luftflotte 4, were
ranged all three Gruppen of KG 27, plus the eight machines of that Geschwader's
specialised train-busting Staffel, 14.(Eis.)/KG 27. First entering service in
February 1943, the `Eis.' in this unit's designation was an abbreviation of
Eisenbahn, meaning `railway'. KG 27 was concentrated at Dnepropetrovsk and
Zaporozhe.
Specialised anti-railway Staffeln, 14.(Eis.)/KG 27 and
14.(Eis.)/KG 55, the latter having been created in June 1943 by the
redesignation of 9./KG 53. Rarely more than a dozen aircraft strong - and
frequently reduced to as few as three or four serviceable machines each - they
were to continue their train-busting activities throughout 1944 and into 1945,
the former under Luftflotte 4 in the south and the latter under Luftflotte 1 (and
subsequently Luftflotte 6) to the north.
